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UNCONVENTIONAL REMEDIES: THE 
FEASIBILITY OF A PRIVATE RECALL 
REMEDY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 
INTRODUCTION 
n August of 2010, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “Chi-
na”) outpaced Japan to become the second largest economy in the 
world.1 In 2009, China eclipsed Germany as the world’s largest exporter 
of goods and surpassed the United States as the largest market for auto-
mobiles.2 Though the United States’ economy remains the world’s larg-
est for the time being, some commentators believe that China may out-
rank the United States as world’s largest economy as early as 2030.3 
Since the 1980s, exports from China’s rapidly expanding economy con-
tinue to inundate the international marketplace.4 As the availability of 
Chinese goods increase, so do reports of defective, contaminated, and 
unsafe products manufactured in China.5 
Due to the media attention directed at China’s growing economy, 
global awareness is growing about the prevalence of defective and dan-
gerous products among Chinese exports. In order to maintain its foothold 
in the international market, China must strive to create an image of safety 
associated with its products and combat the damage left in the wake of 
numerous recent scandals involving the substitution or addition of poi-
sonous chemicals, such as melamine or lead, in an effort to reduce manu-
facturing costs.6 For example, in 2008, baby formula contaminated with 
                                                                                                             
 1. David Barboza, China Overtakes Japan to Become Number Two Global Econom-
ic Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at B1. 
 2. Id. Chinese living standards have drastically improved due to the country’s rapid 
economic growth. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33534, CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 1 (2009), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33534_20091211.pdf. Over the course of the past dec-
ade, China’s legal system has experienced a spike in tort-related litigation, with courts 
hearing more than one million cases per year. Paul Nash, The Chinese Legal System Fac-
es a Tort Conundrum, TAIPEI TIMES, July 13, 2010, at 8. 
 3. Barboza, supra note 1, at B1. 
 4. See Stephen C. Thomas, China’s Economic Development from 1860 to the Pre-
sent, F. ON PUB. POL’Y ONLINE, Winter 2007, at 25–27, available at 
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/archive07/thomas.pdf; see also Sara Bongiorni, My Year 
Without “Made in China”, BOS. GLOBE, July 19, 2010, at A11; Sara Bongiorni, Call for 
Chinese-Toys Ban is Ridiculous, DESERET NEWS (Utah), Sept. 30, 2007, at G04. 
 5. See generally John Schmid, Product Recalls Rise: Analysts Recommend Better 
Relations with China, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 25, 2008, at D2. 
 6. See generally World Health Organization [WHO] Expert Meeting, Ottawa, Can., 
Dec. 1–4, 2008, Toxicological and Health Aspects of Melamine and Cyanuric Acid, at vi 
I 
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melamine7 caused approximately 300,000 infants in China to become ill; 
nearly 50,000 of these infants required hospitalization and six died.8 To 
cut down on manufacturing costs,9 Chinese factory workers watered 
down milk used in baby formula and intentionally added melamine to the 
concoction.10 The melamine concealed the fact that the milk had been 
diluted by making the milk’s protein content appear higher and thus 
masking the lower nutritional value of the watered-down milk.11 Just a 
year earlier, approximately 8,500 pets in the United States died from 
kidney failure after eating pet food made with melamine-contaminated 
wheat gluten and rice protein exported from China.12 Also in 2007,13 
                                                                                                             
(2009) [hereinafter WHO, Melamine], available at 
www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/chem/Melamine_report09.pdf; Meghan Josephine 
Carmody, The Price of Cheap Goods: International Trade with China and the Need for 
Stringent Enforcement of Manufacturing Regulations, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
655, 686 (2008–2009) (explaining that Chinese manufactures often ignore safety stand-
ards to cut costs); Joel Slawotsky, Liability for Defective Chinese Products under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 7 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 519, 525–26 (2008). 
 7. Melamine is a nitrogen based chemical commonly used in plastics, adhesives, 
laminates, countertops, and fertilizer. See Questions and Answers on Melamine, WHO, 
http://www.who.int/csr/media/faq/QAmelamine/en (last visited Oct. 13, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter WHO, Q&A]; WHO, Melamine, supra note 6, at vi; Nikhil Swaminathan, Why is 
Melamine in Baby Formula, Your Food and Your Pets’ Meals?, SCI. AM. NEWS BLOG 
(Sept. 24, 2008, 6:07 PM), http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=why-is-
melamine-in-baby-formula-you-2008-09-24. Melamine contains sixty-six percent nitro-
gen and is often illegally added to food products to boost the apparent protein content of 
the food. Jizan Boy, Effect of Melamine on Milk Products, HUB PAGES, 
http://hubpages.com/hub/Effect-of-Melamine-on-Milk-Products (last visited Oct. 13, 
2011); WHO, Q&A, supra. Prior to the melamine scandal, common methods used for 
measuring protein content in food measured nitrogen levels rather than actual protein 
levels because protein is generally the sole nitrogen source in food. See WHO, Melamine, 
supra note 6, at 4; Swaminathan, supra. The introduction of melamine to the food prod-
uct results in an incorrectly high protein measurement creating the appearance that a low 
protein food is rich with protein and more nutritious. WHO, Q&A, supra. Chronic expo-
sure to melamine has caused bladder or kidney stones, bladder cancer and acute kidney 
failure in animals. Id. 
 8. WHO, Melamine, supra note 6, at vi; Report on: New 2010 “Tort Law of the 
People’s Republic of China,” PAS ADVISORS CO. LTD. (Apr. 24, 2010), 
http://pasadvisors.com/docu/Tort_Law.pdf [hereinafter Tort Law of PRC]. 
 9. See generally WHO, Melamine, supra note 6, at vi; Carmody, supra note 6, at 686 
(explaining that Chinese manufactures often ignore safety standards to cut costs); Slawot-
sky, supra note 6, 525–26. 
 10. WHO, Melamine, supra note 6, at vi; Boy, supra note 7; WHO, Q&A, supra note 
7. 
 11. WHO, Melamine, supra note 6, at 4; Boy, supra note 7; WHO, Q&A, supra note 
7.  
 12. Boy, supra note 7; Swaminathan, supra note 7; WHO, Q&A, supra note 7. 
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Mattel, Inc. recalled over twenty million toys manufactured in China and 
sold in the United States.14 The Chinese manufacturer in this case substi-
tuted a lead-based paint for the non-lead based paint required by Mattel’s 
product specifications.15 Economically attractive but harmful shortcuts 
continue to mar the reputation of China’s manufacturing sector. If China 
wishes to remain the world’s largest exporter, it must win the confidence 
of its domestic and international customers.16 A cohesive legal system 
that effectively regulates manufacturers and protects consumers is essen-
tial to establishing a positive reputation and gaining consumer trust. 
Without improving the reputation of its products and allowing for critical 
product recalls when necessary, China will see its long-term prosperity 
threatened.17 
To address this issue, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress enacted the PRC Tort Liability Law on December 26, 2009.18 
                                                                                                             
 13. 2007 was an especially bad year for products exported from China and the con-
sumers who purchased them. From flammable lamps to poisonous toothpaste, and an 
abundance of children’s toys covered in lead, industry insiders estimate that approximate-
ly half of all product recalls in 2007 (240 out of 473) were for products manufactured in 
China. Schmid, supra note 5, at D2; Bob Weaver, Enjoy the Poison! - Just Pretend, It’s 
All Okay, HUR HERALD (Aug. 16, 2007), http://www.hurherald.com/cgi-
bin/db_scripts/articles?Action=user_view&db=hurheral_articles&id=24652. 
 14. Joseph Ogando, Mattel Recall Was Made in China, DESIGN NEWS, Sept. 24, 2007, 
at 31. 
 15. Id. According to Randall Goodden, a products liability consultant, Chinese manu-
facturers are not at fault for more than half of Chinese products recalled in the United 
States which result from defective product design or engineering. Schmid, supra note 5, 
at D2. However, manufacturers in China are faulted for recalls resulting from the manu-
facturer’s deviation from product plans. Id. 
 16. See generally Carmody, supra note 6, at 694 (stating that China’s economic 
growth relies on consumer driven countries such as the United States and European Un-
ion). 
 17. The author acknowledges that allegations of widespread government corruption 
exist within the Chinese court system. See Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in 
China’s Courts 2–4 (July 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.usasialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-production-of-corruption-in-
Chinas-courts.pdf . While corruption within the Chinese legal system poses a major ob-
stacle to the effectiveness of a private recall remedy, this Note does not address corrup-
tion directly because the problem is not unique its focus. Corruption notwithstanding, the 
structure of China’s legal system may provide a friendly environment for private recall 
remedies. 
 18. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo qin quan ze ren fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) 
[The People’s Republic of China Tort Liability Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) (China), translated 
in World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182630 (last visited Oct. 13, 2011) 
[hereinafter PRC Tort Liability Law]; Tiecheng Yang et al., PRC Tort Liability Law: 
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The law, effective July 1, 2010, attempts to promote “social harmony” by 
protecting personal and property rights while preventing and punishing 
civil misconduct.19 By imposing a duty to recall hazardous products upon 
responsible parties and providing private parties with remedies similar to 
a product recall,20 the Tort Liability Law illustrates China’s desire to im-
prove the reputation of its manufacturing sector within the international 
community. 
This Note explores the feasibility of a private right of action for prod-
uct recalls in China under Article 45 of the PRC’s Tort Liability Law. 
Part I of this Note traces the evolution of China’s product liability regime 
through the PRC Tort Liability Law. Part II examines the Tort Liability 
law’s contribution to China’s product liability jurisprudence and the 
law’s attempt to promote corporate responsibility and personal safety. In 
Part III, this Note addresses the feasibility of a private right of action for 
product recalls in China, using the United States’ recall regime as a 
benchmark. While it is unclear whether or not China’s interpretation of 
Article 45 will provide a private remedy for product recalls, if such a 
right is recognized, China’s civil law system faces fewer implementation 
challenges than the United States’ common law legal system. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW IN THE PRC 
Prior to 1978, China’s tort law was limited to rules and regulations en-
acted by the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Transport pertain-
ing to railroad and maritime accident compensation.21 Wang Weiguo, a 
professor at China University of Political Science and Law, remembers 
teaching at Southwest University of Political Science and Law in 1979 
where “almost no one there knew what tort law was.”22 Since 1978, Chi-
na’s tort law has developed through the enactment of various pieces of 
legislation. 
                                                                                                             
Another Milestone in the PRC Civil Law System, CLIFFORD CHANCE, LLP (June 2010), 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2010/06/prc_tort_liabilityl
awanothermilestoneinth0.html (follow “Download Full Report” hyperlink) [hereinafter 
Another Milestone in the PRC]; Michael Turnbull, A Clearer Page of Tort Liability: Re-
cent Legislation Changes to Civil Tort Liability, DEACONS (July 2010), 
http://www.deaconslaw.com/eng/knowledge/knowledge_378.htm. 
 19. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. I, art. 1 (China). 
 20. See infra Part II.A; see also PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, arts. 45–46 (China). 
 21. Wang Hairong, Making It Right, BEIJING REV., Jan. 14, 2010, at 16, available at 
http://www.bjreview.com/print/txt/2010-01/08/content_239117.htm; Ye Lin, The Tort 
System in China, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 148 (Li Xiaoming & Henry Pitney 
trans., 1989). 
 22. Hairong, supra note 21, at 16. 
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Early Chinese tort law began with the promulgation of the General 
Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC (the “General Principles”) in 
1986,23 which still apply today. The content of the General Principles is 
rather broad and abstract.24 Initially, the legislature intended to imple-
ment a civil code to augment the General Principles; however, the Stand-
ing Committee never enacted additional legislation.25 To satisfy the need 
for more specific guidelines, the Supreme People’s Court adopted the 
Opinion on the General Principles of Civil Law (the “Opinion”) in 1988. 
The Opinion is a judicial interpretation of the General Principles based 
on a proposed civil code draft.26 
Finally, in 1993, the Product Quality Law and the Consumer Rights 
and Interests Protection Law were enacted, providing more detailed regu-
lation of consumer products and consumer rights.27 The Product Quality 
Law, which contains significantly more detail than the General Princi-
ples,28 categorizes product deficiencies as “flaws” or “defects.” Accord-
ingly, liability varies depending on the classification of the deficiency.29 
A product flaw occurs where a product fails to perform as intended or 
where a product’s quality fails to meet the standards outlined on the 
                                                                                                             
 23. Andrew J. Green, Tort Reform with Chinese Characteristics: Towards a “Har-
monious Society” in the People’s Republic of China, 10 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 121, 126, 
130 (2008); Lin, supra note 21, at 148–50 (explaining that the establishment of tort law 
in China began with the enactment of the General Principles which aimed to protect the 
“lawful civil rights and interests of citizens and legal persons”); Julius Melnitzer, Deline-
ating Liability: China’s New Tort Law Raises Questions in an Uncertain Civil Land-
scape, INSIDECOUNSEL, June 1, 2010, at 36. Under the General Principles, an act or omis-
sion leading to an unlawful invasion of the personal or property right of another consti-
tutes a tort. Lin, supra note 21, at 151–53. It is important to recognize that tortious con-
duct only arises where the conduct is unlawful. Id. The actor assumes no liability where 
lawful conduct results in personal injury or property damage. Id. 
 24. Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese Contract Law: History, Development and a 
Comparative Analysis, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 153, 157 (2001). 
 25. Green, supra note 23, at 127. The General Principles of the Civil Law was de-
signed to serve as a framework for civil law interpretation, providing a general basis for 
Chinese tort law; however the General Principles of the Civil Law does not include 
guidelines for judicial interpretation. Id. at 126. 
 26. Id. at 127. 
 27. Id. at 130. The PRC also enacted the Advertisement Law and the Contract Law to 
strengthen the protection of China’s consumers. Brooke Overby, Consumer Protection in 
China after Accession to the WTO, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 347, 352 (2005–
2006). 
 28. Green, supra note 23, at 129. 
 29. Peter Neumann & Calvin Ding, China’s New Tort Law: Dawn of the Product 
Liability Era, CHINA BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 28–30 [hereinafter Neumann & 
Ding, China’s New Tort Law]. 
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product or its packaging.30 Under the Product Quality Law, the seller of a 
flawed product is responsible for compensating injured parties for their 
losses.31 Even where a flaw results from a manufacturing error, the seller 
remains liable to the consumer.32 Nevertheless, in such circumstances, 
the seller may seek to recuperate losses from the product’s manufactur-
er.33 
A product defect, on the other hand, occurs where a product contains 
an unreasonable hazard that threatens a person’s health, safety, or proper-
ty.34 Additionally, a product that fails to meet national or industry health 
and safety standards qualifies as a defect.35 Unlike with a product flaw, 
in a product defect the manufacturer assumes liability for resulting inju-
ries, death or property damage.36 However, the Product Quality Law does 
not provide an aggrieved party with uninhibited access to China’s court 
system, and therefore is not always a sufficient remedy.37 
Additionally, the Consumer Rights and Interests Protection Law38 ex-
pands the Product Quality Law by regulating business services, product 
merchandising, and improper uses of business licenses.39 The law pro-
vides consumers with rights to personal safety, freedom from property 
damage, information regarding goods and services offered for sale, and 
the ability to demand compensation for personal injury or property dam-
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Green, supra note 23, at 129. Green suggests the law instead protects manufactur-
ers from products liability litigation by strictly enforcing arbitration clauses even when 
included in adhesion contracts or contracts that are otherwise unfair. Id. 
 38. The Consumer Rights and Interests Protection Law acts to “protect[] . . . the legit-
imate rights and interests of consumers, maint[ain] . . . the socio-economic order and 
promot[e] . . . the healthy development of [China’s] socialist market economy.” Zhong-
hua Renmin Gongheguo xiao fei zhe quan yi bao hu fa 
(中华人民共和国消华者华益保华法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994), ch. I, art. 1 (China), translated in 
WIPO, Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights and 
Interests, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=209069 (last visited Oct. 15, 
2011). 
 39. Green, supra note 23, at 130; Jeffrey Yang, Consumer Protection Policies for 
MNCs in China, CHINA L. & PRAC., June 2005, available at 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1692457/Channel/9930/Consumer-
Protection-Policies-for-MNCs-in-China.html. 
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age resulting from product defects.40 Furthermore, the Consumer Rights 
and Interests Protection Law requires manufacturers, including govern-
ment manufacturers, to comply with the Product Quality Law; produce 
products and services in accordance with personal and product safety 
standards; and guarantee the quality, usage, and function of products and 
services.41 Under the Consumer Rights and Interests Protection Law, 
where personal injury results from a product defect, the business operator 
is liable to recuperate the injured party for medical and other expenses 
pertaining to the injury.42 
Analyzing the true effect and reach of China’s tort law can be cumber-
some because the law is strewn across numerous pieces of legislation 
that are often incomplete or in conflict with other laws.43 While the Opin-
ion, the Product Quality Law, and the Consumer Rights and Interests 
Protection Law supplement the General Principles, these statutes are very 
general and often provide insufficient explanations of China’s legal doc-
trine.44 Du Wanhua, Presiding Judge of the Supreme People’s Court’s 
No. 1 Civil Trials Tribunal, expressed concern for the complexity and 
volume of China’s tort cases and the judiciary’s need for a comprehen-
sive tort law.45 According to Richard Goetz, leader of Dykema Gossett 
PLLP’s international practice group, “in China, finding the law is half 
the battle.”46 
On top of this, the volume of tort litigation in China’s court system has 
risen tremendously over the past decade.47 This increase in litigation has 
intensified pressure for a unified and comprehensive tort regime.48 In 
response, the Standing Committee issued the PRC Tort Liability Law.49 
                                                                                                             
 40. Yang, supra note 39; Overby, supra note 27, at 353. 
 41. Overby, supra note 27, at 353–54. 
 42. Id. at 354. 
 43. Nash, supra note 2, at 8; John V. Grobowski & Yiqiang Li, Tort Liability Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, FAEGRE & BENSON LLP (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.faegre.com/10911 (explaining how the PRC Tort Liability Law consolidates 
tort principals “scattered among different Chinese laws, regulations and court opinions”). 
 44. Green, supra note 23, at 130. 
 45. Hairong, supra note 21, at 16. 
 46. Melnitzer, supra note 23, at 36. Prior to Goetz’s employment with Dykema 
Gossett PLLC, Goetz served as Associate General Counsel-International at Ford Motor 
Company where he played an instrumental role in establishing Ford’s operations in Chi-
na. Biography for Richard G. Goetz, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, 
http://www.dykema.com/bio/display.asp?empID=574 (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 47. Nash, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that “China has experienced a rapid increase in 
the number of tort-related cases over the past decade, with courts now hearing more than 
one million each year”). 
 48. Neumann & Ding, China’s New Tort Law, supra note 29, at 28–30. 
 49. Turnbull, supra note 18. 
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The Tort Liability Law integrates legal issues covered in pre-existing 
laws into a unified framework for tort law regulation.50 The new tort law 
exemplifies China’s willingness to adapt the rights and protections of 
China’s population along with the evolution of China’s social and eco-
nomic climate.51 Such willingness is illustrated in the tort law’s expan-
sion of individual rights, including, for the first time ever, the recognition 
of individual privacy rights.52 Many commentators view the law as “a 
further step in the path towards the protection of individual rights”53 be-
cause the law provides remedies for injured parties and fosters a consci-
entious attitude amongst corporate and private actors.54 
II. CHAPTER FIVE OF THE PRC’S TORT LIABILITY LAW 
Chapter V of the Tort Liability Law outlines the framework for prod-
ucts liability law in China.55 Contained in only seven articles,56 Chapter 
V consolidates the Product Quality Law and the Consumer Rights and 
Interests Protection Law into one authoritative source for product liabil-
ity law.57 While Chapter V lacks guidance for enforcement, it introduces 
new grounds for liability, expands remedies available to injured parties, 
                                                                                                             
 50. Tort Law of PRC, supra note 8. 
 51. See id.; Hairong, supra note 21, at 16. 
 52. Vincent Zhang, Right to Privacy Established Under Tort Liability Law, 
LINKLATERS LLP (Jan. 18, 2010), 
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1403Newsletter/20100118/Pages/Tort
law.aspx. 
 53. Tort Law of PRC, supra note 8. 
 54. Id.; Wenfei Attorneys-At-Law Ltd., China Legal Briefing 210 (Mar. 8–14, 2010), 
http://www.wenfei.com/fileadmin/archives/clb/CHINA_LEGAL_BRIEFING_210.pdf 
[hereinafter China Legal Briefing]; see Hairong, supra note 21, at 16 (quoting Wang 
Liming) (“The new tort law is people-oriented, and shows that lawmakers have put hu-
man lives and health first.”). Article 17 of the new tort law exemplifies China’s effort to 
advance civil rights. Prior law provided unequal compensation for the tortious deaths of 
rural and urban victims. Hairong, supra note 21, at 16. China’s judiciary reasoned that 
lost wages must be accounted for when computing compensation awards for death. Id. 
The large disparity in earnings for urban workers and rural workers required the court to 
utilize different formulas when computing compensation awards for urban victims and 
rural victims, resulting in significantly larger awards for urban victims. Nash, supra note 
2, at 8. Article 17 of the new tort law rectifies the problem of unequal compensation 
awards by entitling urban victims and rural victims to equal compensation awards for 
deaths caused by the same tort. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. II, art. 17 (China). 
 55. Id. ch. V. 
 56. Id. ch. V, arts. 41–47. 
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 59–68. 
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and remains in line with the Tort Liability Law’s spirit of enhancing so-
cial welfare.58 
Chapter V of the Tort Liability Law enforces the same general rules as 
the Product Quality Law.59 However, the tort liability law disposes of the 
Product Quality Law’s distinction between product flaws and defects.60 
Instead, the Tort Liability Law only refers to defective61 products, distin-
guishing between defects caused by the product’s manufacturer, the 
product’s seller, and third parties.62 Unlike the Product Quality Law, 
where the party liable depends on whether a product flaw or defect is 
present, the new tort law allows the injured party to pursue a damage 
award from either the product’s manufacturer or seller.63 Furthermore, 
the Tort Liability Law provides that where the defect is the fault of the 
manufacturer and the seller has assumed liability, the seller is entitled to 
reimbursement by the manufacturer.64 Likewise, where the defect is the 
fault of the seller and the manufacturer has assumed liability, the manu-
facturer has the right to reimbursement from the seller.65 Finally, the Tort 
Liability Law also provides that where the defect is the result of a third 
party66 and an injured party is awarded damages from either the manu-
facturer or the seller, the party assuming liability may be reimbursed by 
                                                                                                             
 58. See PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. I, art. 1 & ch. V (China). 
 59. Peter Neumann & Calvin Ding, China Passes Tort Law: A Brave New World of 
Punitive Damages?, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP (Dec. 30, 2009), 
http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-401-
15002/pdfCopy.pdf?view=attachment [hereinafter Neumann & Ding, A Brave New 
World]; Turnbull, supra note 18. 
 60. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V (China). 
 61. The Tort Liability Law does not redefine the term “defect.” Id.; Lu Yunguang & 
Margalit Faden, The New Tort Law and Product Liability, WANG JING & CO. (Jan. 13, 
2011), http://www.wjnco.com/eng/articles_show.asp?Articles_id=196. 
 62. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V (China). 
 63. Id. ch. V, art. 43. Additionally, to protect injured parties, the tort law provides that 
where a single tortious act requires the tortfeasor to compensate an injured party and 
subjects the tortfeasor to administrative liability or criminal liability, if the tortfeasor’s 
assets are not sufficient to make all required payments, the tortfeasor must first compen-
sate the injured party. Id. ch. 1, art. 4; see China Legal Briefing, supra note 54. 
 64. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 43 (China). 
 65. Id. 
 66. The Tort Liability Law explicitly names warehousemen and carriers as examples 
of third parties who may be responsible for product defects. Id. ch. V, art. 44. Neverthe-
less, the language of the law implies that for the purposes of identifying third parties, the 
scope is not in any way limited to warehousemen and carriers. See id. Other third parties 
who come in contact with products prior to the sale to the buyer can be the cause of a 
product defect and therefore responsible for reimbursing the seller or manufacturer. Id. 
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the third party.67 An injured party, however, is not entitled to recover 
damages directly from the third party.68 
In addition to providing compensation for damages,69 the Tort Liability 
Law also introduces a limited punitive damages remedy.70 Under the new 
tort law, punitive damages are only available where a manufacturer or 
seller is aware of a product defect and nonetheless continues to manufac-
ture or sell the product.71 Furthermore, the defect must cause death or 
serious injury.72 This is the first time Chinese law has provided punitive 
damages as a remedy73 and appears to be a response to recent scandals 
that have caused an abundance of worldwide recalls of Chinese prod-
ucts.74 Similar to many of China’s regulations, Article 47 provides puni-
tive damages as a remedy without providing guidance as to the judici-
ary’s implementation of such punitive damages awards.75 Some com-
mentators predict that standards will be clarified through judicial inter-
pretation, while others feel that China’s courts may be hesitant to impose 
punitive damages without guidelines from the government.76 Nonethe-
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. 
 68. Another Milestone in the PRC, supra note 18. 
 69. The PRC’s Tort Liability Law maximizes the damage awards an injured party is 
entitled to receive. Previously, Article 119 of the General Principles limited compensa-
tion for personal injuries to medical expenses, loss of income from work, and expenses 
arising out of living as a disabled person. Lin, supra note 21, at 160. Furthermore, Article 
119 limited damages for death to funeral expenses and maintenance payments for the 
decedent’s surviving dependents. Id. Article 119 also provided compensation for medical 
expenses and loss of income from work if the decedent’s death occurred during medical 
treatment. Id. 
 70. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 47 (China). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. The PRC Tort Liability Law does not specify what constitutes serious injury. 
See id. ch. V, art. 47. 
 73. David Dai & Alex An, New Tort Liability Law: Ramifications for Companies 
Doing Business in China, MWE CHINA LAW OFFICES, 
http://www.mwechinalaw.com/news/2010/chinalawalert0110a.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2011) [hereinafter Dai & An]. In a very rare exception, China enacted The Consumer 
Rights Protection Law and The Food Safety Law in response to an incident where con-
taminated milk was sold to consumers. Id. The laws allow injured parties limited recov-
ery of punitive damages in cases of fraud against consumers or violations of food safety 
regulations. Id. However, punitive damages in these instances are limited. Id. The Con-
sumer Rights Protection Law allows an injured party to recover only the purchase price 
of a product and the Food Safety Law limits an injured party’s punitive damages award to 
ten times the purchase price of a product. Id. The new tort law, however, is the first piece 
of Chinese legislation to actually use the term punitive damages. Id. 
 74. Neumann & Ding, A Brave New World, supra note 59. 
 75. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 47 (China). 
 76. See Dai & An, supra note 73; Nash, supra note 2, at 8. 
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less, most observers do agree that if any punitive damages are awarded, 
they will not be excessive.77 
Where a manufacturer or seller learns of a product defect after the 
product enters the market, the manufacturer or seller must warn the pub-
lic of a defect or recall the product in question to avoid liability.78 A 
product recall is another form of remedy where a manufacturer or seller 
of a defective or unsafe product requests that purchasers of the product 
return it.79 The goal of a product recall is “to limit liability for corporate 
negligence (which can cause costly legal penalties) and to improve or 
avoid damage to publicity.”80 Executing a product recall is often expen-
sive because the recall may require that the responsible party pay to re-
place or repair the defective product or reimburse purchasers for the 
price of the product.81 While the cost of executing a product recall may 
be high, it is generally believed that recalls are less expensive than the 
cost of damages and the subsequent harm to a brand’s reputation.82 
A. Article 46 Provides for Recalls; Article 45 Creates Questions 
Article 46 of the Tort Liability Law creates a duty for manufacturers 
and sellers to warn consumers and recall products when the manufacturer 
or seller knows of a defective product in the stream of commerce.83 Prior 
to the enactment of the PRC Tort Liability Law, China’s product recall 
rules included provisions aimed at specific products84 rather than at de-
                                                                                                             
 77. Dai & An, supra note 73 (explaining that because the Chinese judicial system 
does not include jury trials, the excessive punitive damages awards often issued by juries 
will not be seen in China); Nash, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that observers do not believe 
that Chinese courts will award massive punitive damages awards in the near future). 
 78. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 46 (China). 
 79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (8th ed. 2004). 
 80. Brett Bumeter, Definition of Product Recall, DISTRIB. BUS. ARTICLES (Aug. 21, 
2007, 4:12 PM), http://distributionbusinessarticles.blogspot.com/2007/08/definition-of-
product-recall.html. 
 81. Id.; Jeffrey A. Lamken, Note, Efficient Accident Prevention as a Continuing Ob-
ligation: The Duty to Recall Defective Products, 42 STAN. L. REV. 103, 104 (1989–1990). 
 82. Bumeter, supra note 79. 
 83. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 46 (China). 
 84. Prior to the PRC’s Tort Liability Law, Chinese law provided recall rules with 
respect to automobiles, food, and toys. Mark Schaub, New PRC Defective Product Recall 
System: Implementation, KING & WOOD (Apr. 30, 2009), 
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2009/04/articles/corporate/new-prc-defective-product-
recall-system-implementation. China’s legislature promulgated the initial recall regime in 
response to emergency situations. Id. For example, in 2004 China instituted recall regula-
tions for defective automobiles in response to foreign car manufacturers depriving Chi-
nese consumers rights allotted to consumers in other jurisdictions (mainly the United 
States and European countries). Id. 
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fective products in general.85 However, Article 46 of the PRC Tort Lia-
bility Law applies to all defective products,86 providing that where a 
product defect is discovered after the product has entered the stream of 
commerce,87 the manufacturer or seller must take remedial measures 
such as issuing a warning or recall in a timely manner.88 Any manufac-
turer or seller who fails to take remedial measures or “sufficient and ef-
fective” action in a timely manner is liable for any harm caused by the 
defective product.89 This provision establishes a post-sale duty to warn or 
recall for manufacturers and sellers who become aware of a defect after 
the product has entered the marketplace.90 
In addition to compelling manufacturers and sellers to initiate recalls, 
Article 45 of the tort law allows injured parties to require a manufacturer 
or seller of a defective product that threatens personal or property safety 
to eradicate the threat.91 The law states that “where the defect of a prod-
uct endangers the personal or property safety of another person, the vic-
tim shall be entitled to require the manufacturer or seller to assume the 
tort liabilities by removing the obstruction or eliminating the danger.”92 
The language of Article 45 suggests that any victim of harm from a 
faulty product, whether person or property, can demand in court that the 
product’s manufacturer or seller take action to “eliminate the danger.”93 
This interpretation creates a mechanism for a court to issue decrees for 
mandatory recalls and gives standing to private individuals to demand 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. 
 86. Due to the large number of claims regarding defective products both internation-
ally and in China, the need for China to expand its recall regime to cover a larger scope 
of products increased. Another Milestone in the PRC, supra note 18. The new tort law’s 
expansion of products for which manufacturers and sellers may be required to institute a 
recall is seemingly China’s attempt to address the recent scandals among China’s manu-
facturers producing and selling defective and hazardous products. Neumann & Ding, A 
Brave New World, supra note 59. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 69–77 for product defects discovered before 
the product entered the stream of commerce. Article 47 of the Tort Liability Law ad-
dresses manufacturers and sellers who, aware of a product’s defect, continues to sell or 
produce the defective product. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 47 (China). Where the 
defective product causes death or otherwise serious damage to the health of another per-
son, the injured party has a right to punitive damages. Id. 
 88. Id. ch. V, art. 46. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See generally M. Stuart Madden, The Quiet Revolution in Post-Sale Duties, 2004 
A.B.A. PROD. LIAB. COMM. REP. 8–37. 
 91. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 45 (China).  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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that manufacturers or sellers eliminate danger resulting from harmful 
products.94 
Once a product has entered the stream of commerce, no actions can 
fully “eliminat[e] the danger” of the defect. A manufacturer or seller can 
notify consumers and purchasers of the product’s defect and its resulting 
hazards,95 but a warning does not entirely eliminate the danger posed by 
the defect because the defective product remains in stores and in the pos-
session of customers.96 In addition to warning consumers of danger, 
manufacturers and sellers can cease production and sale of a defective 
product.97 Preventing additional defective products from entering the 
marketplace helps limit future injuries; however, defective products al-
ready in the marketplace continue to threaten public safety.98 The Tort 
Liability Law’s requirement to eliminate the danger of a defect therefore 
imposes more than a manufacturer or seller’s post-sale duty to warn or a 
duty to cease production and sale of a defective product.99 
To truly eliminate the danger posed by a defective product, action tak-
en by manufacturers and sellers must address the defective products al-
ready in possession of consumers.100 Replacing a defective product with 
a non-defective one or repairing a defect would sufficiently eliminate 
danger by removing the defect from the public. Furthermore, refunding 
the purchaser for the price of the product could adequately eliminate the 
danger by providing an incentive for the purchaser to return the defective 
product or dispose of the defective product. If the Chinese court system 
adopts a literal interpretation of “eliminating the danger,” Article 45 will 
                                                                                                             
 94. While Article 46 uses mandatory language (“the manufacturer or seller shall take 
such remedial measures”), Article 46 actually gives the manufacturer or seller discretion 
to decide between issuing a product recall and assuming the tort, and possibly punitive 
liability. Id. ch. V, art. 46 (emphasis added). A judgment under Article 45 would mandate 
that a manufacturer or seller must eliminate the danger rather than allowing the manufac-
turer or seller to exercise its discretion. Id. ch. V, art. 45 (emphasis added). 
 95. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 7-2, 7-3 
(Mar. 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManua
l/UCM074312.pdf [hereinafter FDA MANUAL]; Madden, supra note 90, at 8–37. 
 96. See Kenneth Ross, Avoiding Future Problems: The Increased Duty to Take Post-
Sale Remedial Action, 2004 A.B.A. PROD. LIAB. COMM. REP. 38–51. 
 97. See FDA MANUAL, supra note 95, §§ 7-2, 7-3. Failure to cease the manufacture or 
sale of a product that is known to have a defect which causes death or serious bodily 
harm exposes the manufacture or seller to liability for punitive damages to injured par-
ties. PRC Tort Liability Law, ch. V, art. 47 (China). 
 98. See Ross, supra note 96, at 38–51. 
 99. See Madden, supra note 90, at 38. 
 100. See FDA MANUAL, supra note 95, §§ 7-2, 7-3; Madden, supra note 90, at 8–37. 
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provide an injured party with a remedy akin to a product recall.101 Fur-
thermore, many commentators support the view that Article 45 of the 
PRC Tort Liability Law creates a private right of action for product re-
calls.102 
III. THE FEASIBILITY OF A PRIVATE RECALL REMEDY IN THE PRC 
In the United States, a private party does not have standing to demand 
a manufacturer or seller recall a defective product.103 A recall can only be 
issued voluntarily104 by the manufacturer or seller, or requested by cer-
tain government agencies105 pursuant to a statute or regulation.106 Private 
                                                                                                             
 101. Compare FDA MANUAL, supra note 95, §§ 7-2, 7-3 (explaining the purpose of 
product recalls and outlining product recall procedures and requirements) with PRC Tort 
Liability Law, ch. V, art. 45 (China). 
 102. See, e.g., Another Milestone in the PRC, supra note 18; Neumann & Ding, A 
Brave New World, supra note 59 (explaining that Article 45 may lead to mandatory 
product recalls, warning labels, or other corrective action); Fai Hung Cheung et al., PRC 
Tort Liability Law, ALLEN & OVERY (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&cont
entSubTypeID=7944&itemID=54378&prefLangID=410 (stating that Article 45 may 
allow injured parties a legal remedy for the recall of defective products). 
 103. Richard C. Warmer, Judges as Regulators: Using Injunctive Relief to Recall 
Products, 68 DEF. COUNSEL J. 299, 299 (2001). However, the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 which amends the Consumer Product Safety Act, provides 
State attorneys with standing to bring lawsuits on behalf of the residents of their state in 
certain circumstances. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-314, § 218, 122 Stat. 3016, 3060, available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpsia.pdf. 
 104. Under United States law, a manufacturer is not under a duty to recall defective 
products. S. Patrick McKey & Nicola Fiordalisi, An Overview of United States Product 
Recall Law, GARDNER CARTON & DOUGLAS (Aug. 2002), 
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/06752439-cd0c-4492-83d8-
a013b37041b0/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/9cefaa61-3daa-46e2-9299-93022932ef78/ProductsRecallLaw.pdf. 
However, if a manufacturer voluntarily recalls a defective product, the manufacturer has 
a duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the recall. Id. The duty of reasonable 
care is required in a voluntary recall because voluntary recalls are generally carried out in 
anticipation of a recall directed by a governmental agency. Id. If a manufacturer is aware 
of a hazardous product defect, the manufacturer is under a duty to warn consumers of the 
hazard. Id. Therefore, even where there is no duty to undertake a voluntary recall, once 
the manufacture is aware of the defect, he is under a duty to warn consumers. Id. 
 105. Governmental agencies authorized to request a product recall include the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
Food and Drug Administration, United States Coast Guard, Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Consumer Product Safety Improve-
ment Act § 214; Warmer, supra note 103, at 299. However, with the exception of recent 
legislation, many governmental agencies do not have authority to require a mandatory 
recall. Brian Giannini, FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, EXPERT RECALL (Apr. 12, 
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remedies do not include product recalls because recalls are burdensome 
and costly107 for manufacturers.108 Furthermore, since a product recall 
may seriously undermine the reputation of the company issuing the re-
call,109 a thorough investigation into the product defect and its resulting 
harm is necessary prior to mandating a recall.110 In the United States, 
authorities believe government agencies, rather than the court system, are 
better positioned to execute recall investigations because government 
agencies possess the proper technical, engineering, and empirical exper-
tise to conduct thorough investigations and address technical arguments 
made by manufacturers.111 For this reason, in addition to avoiding incon-
sistent judicial rulings, specialized governmental agencies, rather than 
private individuals, have standing to order the recall of a defective prod-
uct.112 
While most authorities agree that the United States court system is ill-
equipped to serve the interests necessary for the implementation of effec-
tive product recalls, China’s court system differs from the United States’ 
                                                                                                             
2010), http://www.expertrecall.com/fda-food-safety-modernization-act. The agencies 
serve a reactionary function, locating a problem after receiving injury reports and asking 
manufacturers to voluntarily recall products. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act 
§ 214; Giannini, supra. Recent legislation including the FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act, the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2009, and a draft proposal enti-
tled the Product Recall, Information and Safety Modernization Act work to provide au-
thority for government agencies to enforce preventative measures aimed at keeping dan-
gerous products from entering the stream of commerce. Consumer Product Safety Im-
provement Act § 214; Product Recall, Information and Safety Modernization (“PRISM”) 
Act (Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://www.cpsc.gov/PR/PRISM.pdf; Giannini, supra. 
 106. Warmer, supra note 103, at 299. 
 107. When a corporation recalls a defective product it incurs the actual costs of repair, 
notifying consumers and prospective consumers, and recovering the product. Lamken, 
supra note 81, at 109. While the actual costs of a product recall are high, damage to a 
company’s brand and goodwill is often the most costly loss associated with a product 
recall. Marialuisa Gallozzi & Seth A. Tucker, Exploring the Option of Product Recall 
Insurance, INS. COVERAGE L. BULL. (Oct. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005493312. On average, a product recall will 
cost a company “a full quarter of profits for the recalled product, marketing to repair long 
term brand damage, spillover negativity that reduces sales of other products, product 
liability claims and the cost of restoring status within distribution channels.” Craig Gun-
ther, The High Cost of Product Recall, VIGILISTICS, INC. (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.vigilistics.com/pdf/The%20Cost%20of%20Product%20Recall.pdf. 
 108. See Warmer, supra note 103, at 300. 
 109. Gunther, supra note 107. 
 110. See Warmer, supra note 103, at 299. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. 
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judiciary in a number of significant ways. These differences allow Chi-
na’s courts to function in a similar manner to United States federal agen-
cies and less like the U.S. courts. 
A. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction 
The United States federal courts have consistently held that a private 
right of action compelling a product recall or invoking a manufacturer or 
seller’s post-sale duty to warn does not comport with the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction.113 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allocates au-
thority to regulate federal statutes between the United States federal 
courts and federal regulatory agencies.114 The United States Supreme 
Court created the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to reconcile decision-
making authority between courts and federal agencies115 where the adju-
dicative authority of regulatory agencies and judicial jurisdiction con-
verge.116 The rationale employed by the United States Supreme Court for 
denying a private right of action for product recall remedies can be ascer-
tained through understanding the three interests served by the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction: comparative competence between federal agencies 
                                                                                                             
 113. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R., Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1956). 
Primary jurisdiction . . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the 
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the 
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within 
the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial 
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body 
for its views. 
Id. (citing Gen. Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 433 
(1940)); In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 (D.N.J. 2007) 
(explaining that the federal courts should defer to the FDA because the courts do not 
possess sufficient expertise to determine issues regarding the extent of remedial action for 
product defects. Congress granted regulatory authority to the FDA to investigate and 
manage product recalls as the FDA possesses the requisite expertise to make the proper 
determinations regarding necessary protective measures in each particular situation. Ad-
ditionally, even in a situation where a court issued an order for a corporation to invoke its 
duty to warn or initiate a product recall, the FDA would not be precluded from requiring 
alternative or additional action from the corporation, creating the potential for conflict 
and confusion.). 
 114. Paula K. Knippa, Note, Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Circumforaneous 
Litigant, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (2006–2007). 
 115. W. Pac. R.R., Co., 352 U.S. at 63 (“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . is 
concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative 
agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.”). 
 116. Knippa, supra note 114, at 1290. 
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and courts, uniformity of judgments, and flexibility.117 Furthermore, pol-
icies regarding the issuance of equitable remedies are also a factor.118 
1. Comparative Competence between Federal Agencies and Courts 
Courts invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction when litigation is-
sues fall under the scope of federal regulatory agencies. The doctrine 
reflects the courts’ determination that federal agencies are better suited 
than courts to address particular issues.119 First, Congress acknowledged 
that specific issues—such as when a product recall is necessary—require 
thorough investigations into often scientific or technical subject mat-
ter.120 To address this need for elevated information, Congress has given 
regulatory agencies limited but pertinent investigative and adjudicative 
authority.121 The regulatory agencies employ technical and scientific ex-
perts to create standards and carry out investigations.122 The agencies’ 
staff also work within the regulated industry on a regular basis and even-
tually become experts in the substantive areas they regulate, positioning 
them as superior fact-finders than courts.123 
Courts, on the other hand, are generalists.124 In litigation regarding 
highly complex issues, without the aid of institutional expertise that 
regulatory agencies rely on, courts often lack adequate resources to un-
                                                                                                             
 117. For an overview of the interests served by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction see 
Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary Jurisdic-
tion Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved Products, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1039, 1044 (2008) or Bryson Santaguida, Comment, The Primary Jurisdiction 
Two-Step, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1526–27 (2007). 
 118. See infra text accompanying notes 172–81. 
 119. Knippa, supra note 114, at 1295; Santaguida, supra note 117, at 1518. 
 120. See Santaguida, supra note 117, at 1526. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.; Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An 
Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 258 (1988). 
 124. Metro. Bd. of Pub. Educ. v. Guest, 193 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1989)) 
(explaining that federal courts are generalists with no specialized knowledge regarding 
the educational needs of handicapped children, and therefore fact-finding should be left 
to the expertise of state agencies created for that purpose); Hon. Guido Calabresi, Owen 
J. Roberts Memorial Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School: The Current, 
Subtle—and Not So Subtle—Rejection of an Independent Judiciary,  (Jan. 31, 2002), in 4 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 639 (2002) (“Judges are generalists who deal with a variety of 
matters and there are very good reasons why they should do so. But breadth inhibits 
depth, so the idea that judges should defer to experts is a perfectly sensible one.”); JAMES 
G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 35–38 (1995) 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf. 
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derstand core issues and are therefore unable to properly balance consid-
erations necessary for decision-making.125 Courts, therefore, invoke the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, giving discretion to regulatory agencies 
in instances where a “better informed” and more “uniform” ruling can be 
produced by utilizing the agency’s “specialized knowledge, expertise, 
and central position within a regulatory regime.”126 
In authorizing federal agencies to regulate product recalls, Congress 
acknowledges that the fact-finding required in determining the necessity 
of a product recall exceeds the level of fact-finding that courts ordinarily 
conduct in litigation.127 An adjudicative body must be able to weigh the 
benefits and costs of a product recall in light of this highly technical or 
scientific information.128 Congress believes that regulatory agencies are 
better suited to address the complex issue of product recalls, as courts’ 
limited resources would be quickly drained by the extreme level of fact-
finding necessary for a private recall remedy.129 For these reasons, the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction has evolved as a mechanism that allows 
courts to defer to Congressional intent in such instances and allow the 
wisdom of federal agencies to govern. 
The idea that the United States court system is not properly situated to 
conduct the level of research necessary to permit product recalls is not 
shared by China’s civil law system.130 The United States’ court system, 
similar to most common-law court systems, typically relies on courts of 
general jurisdiction to hear cases with diverse subject matter.131 China’s 
court system, on the other hand, utilizes numerous specialized courts 
with jurisdiction limited to specific issues.132 China favors specialty 
courts in order to ease the burdens133 of the country’s large and scattered 
legislative framework.134 While a specialty court for product recalls has 
not been established, the number of specialized courts continues to rise 
                                                                                                             
 125. Santaguida, supra note 117, at 1526. 
 126. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673 (2003). 
 127. See supra note 94. 
 128. See supra note 96 regarding the negative costs associated with initiating a recall. 
 129. Such extensive discovery would also create massive expenses for litigants. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 118–28. 
 131. APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 124, at 35–38. 
 132. Jiang Huiling, Judicial Reform, in CHINA’S JOURNEY TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 
199, 216 (Cai Dingjian & Wang Chenguang eds., 2010). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
 134. APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 124, at 35–38 (explaining that civil-law countries 
often utilize a compartmentalized court system where courts are limited to hearing cases 
dealing with one type of law). 
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as the variety of cases handled by China’s courts increases.135 These spe-
cialty courts have the advantage of allowing judges to become experts in 
the area of law covered by the court they preside over, resulting in con-
sistent rulings in the particular field of the court.136 United States Federal 
judges, on the other hand, do not have the opportunity to become special-
ists in fields that require specialized knowledge.137 The potential for Chi-
na’s judiciary to establish a specialty court to provide private product 
recall remedies makes China a favorable forum. In common-law coun-
tries, lawyers present cases on behalf of their clients and judges serve as 
referees.138 In contrast, the inquisitorial nature of China’s civil law court 
system heightens the role of the presiding judge.139 A judge in China’s 
court system acts as the principle investigator, responsible for investigat-
ing claims on both sides of a case.140 Over time, the Chinese court has 
adopted aspects of the common-law justice system;141 however, civil 
law’s inquisitorial method of adjudication remains the dominant system 
in China.142 This inquisitorial judicial system furthers the Chinese court’s 
ability to develop expertise in the field of product recalls. Similar to the 
United States’ regulatory agencies, judges in a Chinese specialty court 
                                                                                                             
 135. Huiling, supra note 132, at 216–17 (stating that the Supreme People’s Court in-
cludes five specialized criminal courts, four specialized civil courts, one specialized court 
to deal with case filings, a specialized administrative law court, and a specialized adjudi-
cation supervision court). Chinese courts of special jurisdiction include the Military Court 
of China, the Railway Transport Court of China, the Maritime Court of China, the forest-
ry court, the agricultural reclamation court, and the petroleum court. The National Court 
Organizations, CHINA.ORG.CN (May 20, 2003), 
http://www.china.org.cn/features/state_structure/2003-05/20/content_1065040.htm. In 
addition to creating courts of specialized jurisdiction, a 2008 amendment to the Civil 
Procedure Law provides that lower courts and intermediate courts may establish en-
forcement bodies for the purpose of enforcing judicial judgments made by the court. 
Huiling, supra note 132, at 217. The ability of each specialized court to create mecha-
nisms to enforce their judgments strengthens the court’s reach by diminishing the prob-
lem of unenforced judgments. Id. 
 136. Michael Williams, Do We Need More Federal Specialty Courts?, VIEW FROM 
LL2 (Sept. 17, 2010), http://viewfromll2.com/2010/09/17/do-we-need-more-federal-
specialty-courts. 
 137. Id. 
 138. APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 124, at 35–38. 
 139. Id.; Huiling, supra note 132, at 206. 
 140. Huiling, supra note 132, at 233. 
 141. Chinese judges have begun to limit their influence on trial litigation to focus on 
the parties’ perception of the case. Id. Courts have also begun to place the burden of pro-
duction on the party making a legal claim rather than relying on the presiding judge sole-
ly for the production of information. Id. These changes have allowed parties to have more 
influence on the outcome of the case. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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will deal with product recall issues exclusively and on a regular basis, 
becoming experts in the field of product recalls.143 By functioning more 
like a United States regulatory agency than a generalist United States 
federal court, the Chinese judicial system is better tailored to provide a 
private recall remedy than is the United States judicial system. Compara-
tively speaking, the competence of China’s court system in this area is 
more analogous to the competence of United States regulatory agencies 
on this topic than to the United States federal judicial system. 
2. Uniformity of Judgments 
In addition to the notion that regulatory agencies have access to better 
information to make decisions, a second justification for the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction is the need for uniform decision-making with respect 
to issues falling under federal regulation.144 By restricting the adjudica-
tive authority to a centralized body, the opportunity for conflicting judg-
ments is reduced.145 For this reason, the United States limits its federal 
court’s regulation of product recalls, providing federal regulatory agen-
cies with regulation powers.146 Allowing federal courts to adjudicate the-
se issues introduces the chance that district courts, situated throughout 
the country, may project geographical biases in their fact-finding and 
decision-making,147 resulting in varied disclosure procedures across ju-
risdictions for the same recall. Lack of uniformity in standards for prod-
uct recalls can be detrimental to a recall’s effectiveness148 because recall 
campaigns would have to meet each jurisdiction’s unique standards.149 
Having multiple recall campaigns for the same product would also create 
confusion among the public, because information released would not be 
consistent nationwide. Since federal agencies regulate a manufacturer or 
seller’s duty to warn of a potential hazard, the agencies have created con-
sistent standards regarding the information that is required to be dis-
closed during a product recall.150 This ensures that in the case of a na-
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. at 216. 
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tional product recall, the company responsible for implementing the re-
call will have a uniform approach to its recall throughout the country. 
The release of consistent information regarding a product recall cam-
paign ultimately contributes to the recall’s overall effectiveness.151 
China’s civil law legal system does not present the same challenges as 
found in the United States with respect to inconsistent judgments result-
ing from a court mandated recall. Judicial decisions in civil law systems 
do not create law.152 Instead, civil law judges resolve disputes by apply-
ing legislation rather than looking to prior case law153 because past court 
decisions do not bind a civil law court in the same manner that precedent 
binds a common-law court.154 Binding precedent becomes problematic in 
the United States because of the country’s many judicial districts. With 
each district developing its own case law, a recall suit brought in one 
district could result in a different judicial decision than the same recall 
suit brought in another district. In contrast, due to the civil law nature of 
China’s legal system—specifically the fact that Chinese courts do not 
create law—China will not encounter the problem of inconsistent judg-
ments, as the law applies uniformly over the entire country.155 Another 
important distinction between China’s court system and the United 
States’ court system is the court’s role in interpreting statutes. The func-
tion of the Chinese judiciary is to apply statutes that have been interpret-
ed by the Chinese government.156 Alternatively, in the United States, 
courts are free to interpret how a statute should be applied within the 
court’s jurisdiction. While the application and interpretation of a statute 
may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the United States, the Chi-
nese government determines how to interpret and apply Chinese statutes, 
and all courts in China are obligated to abide by that interpretation and 
application.157 China’s system eliminates any variation in the application 
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of its laws, which would lead to uniform product recall standards 
throughout the country. 
To further aid the consistency of judicial decisions, chief justices with-
in China’s judicial system attend conferences to periodically discuss is-
sues challenging the legal system.158 The conferences provide a forum 
for judges to discuss challenging legal issues encountered in practice, 
establish standards for consistent judicial decisions, and address cases 
that may serve to guide future decisions.159 As a result of these confer-
ences, the Supreme People’s Court implemented a system of “typical 
cases” meant to guide the judiciary.160 The typical cases system provides 
a body of case law to guide judicial application in hopes of further ensur-
ing uniform standards.161 Despite the similarities between binding prece-
dent and China’s typical cases system, these typical cases are not bind-
ing162 and the Supreme People’s Court does not plan to adopt the binding 
precedent system utilized by common law countries.163 
As uniformity is essential to effective product recalls, Chinese-granted 
remedies to private parties will not create inconsistency because all 
courts in China are bound to the government’s interpretations of the law, 
which is then enforced in an identical manner. 
3. Flexibility 
A third justification for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is agency 
flexibility.164 In order to properly implement product recalls, changes to 
procedures and interpretations of regulatory statutes may be necessary 
from time to time to accommodate technological or industrial innova-
tions.165 Agencies are free to alter their procedures and interpretations of 
the federal statutes under their power.166 In contrast, the United States 
federal court system does not enjoy the same level flexibility as the regu-
latory agencies enjoy167 because courts are bound by precedent and once 
a court interprets a statute, it is unlikely that it will alter its initial inter-
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pretation.168 Furthermore, courts are often slow or unwilling to accom-
modate technological or industrial developments.169 
Flexibility may also pose a challenge for Chinese product recalls; how-
ever, the flexibility challenges faced by the Chinese government are 
more analogous to the challenges faced by a United States regulatory 
agency than to the challenges faced by the United States federal court 
system. While the Chinese government may be slow to adapt recall pro-
cedures to changes in technology or safety specifications, this potential 
barrier to flexibility would be attributable to the political implications of 
any proposed policy change. United States federal agencies also must 
make policy considerations before adapting any recall procedures, thus 
raising the agencies’ sensitivity to industry changes. Nevertheless, the 
flexibility problem viewed in the United States as prohibiting private 
actions for product recalls is not a problem with federal agencies but in-
stead a flexibility issue facing the federal court system.170 The specific 
barriers to flexibility faced by the United States federal court system are 
not shared by the Chinese courts because judges are obligated to interpret 
statutes as the government directs.171 Unlike its counterpart in the United 
States, China’s judiciary is not bound by precedent, and therefore, is 
more amenable to evolution.172 
B. The Private Right of Action and Equitable Remedies 
In the United States, recognizing a private right of action to demand a 
product recall would require the federal court system173 to issue injunc-
tions barring the manufacture or sale of a defective product.174 The court 
would have to issue an order compelling the responsible party to notify 
the public of the defect, and initiate a program to reimburse, repair or 
replace the product.175 Courts often invoke the doctrine of primary juris-
diction where a party’s request for injunctive relief requires the court to 
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utilize its discretion,176 as would be the case in a private recall action. 
Injunctions are common-law equitable remedies developed to provide 
relief where legal remedies are otherwise unavailable or where available 
remedies do not serve the interest of fairness and justice.177 Courts in the 
United States only grant equitable remedies in situations where damages 
insufficiently provide relief.178 Under this system, parties injured by 
product defects should not be entitled to equitable relief because they 
may recover compensatory damages and even punitive damages. The 
United States legal system therefore eliminates the need for awarding an 
injured party the equitable remedy of a recall. 
Equitable remedies are even less prevalent in China, as well as in other 
civil law countries, because a separate system of equitable relief does not 
exist in the civil law system.179 To address the problem of relief where 
legal remedies are insufficient, lawmakers in civil law jurisdictions often 
provide for equitable remedies in legislation.180 Article 45 of the Tort 
Liability Law is an example of an equitable remedy built into the struc-
ture of civil-law legislation.181 If the Chinese government interprets Arti-
cle 45 as granting private parties remedies to obtain court orders mandat-
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ing product recalls, China would effectively be providing equitable relief 
to injured parties where legal remedies such as money damages exist. 
The common-law policy against awarding equitable remedies where 
damages serve as an adequate remedy does not undermine the implemen-
tation of a private recall remedy in China’s civil law system because Ar-
ticle 45 provides for the equitable recall remedy.182 
CONCLUSION 
To combat the reputational damage China’s products have experienced 
over the past few years, China must take action to show the world it is 
serious about improving the quality of its exports. The enactment of the 
PRC Tort Liability Law is a positive first step. Nonetheless, China must 
continue to follow through and enforce the laws it has enacted rigorously 
and consistently. By enforcing the tort law’s recall remedies, China will 
show the world that it values the safety of its consumers and is focused 
on improvement. Furthermore, the availability of private recall remedies 
will force manufacturers and sellers to reevaluate their business practices 
in China by tightening their quality control procedures in order to avoid 
tort liability. 
Exactly how the Chinese government will interpret Article 45 is still 
unclear; however, what is clear is that China’s civil-law judicial founda-
tion, coupled with its specialized courts system, creates a favorable envi-
ronment for private recall remedies. The recognition of private recall 
remedies will not only improve the safety and quality of China’s exports, 
but also will help secure China’s position in the global marketplace and 
provide the country’s citizens with a more prosperous economy and thus, 
a higher quality of life. 
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